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CANADIAN BSE CONTINUES TO DISRUPT
THE SUPPLY CHAIN FOR BEEF
Ellen Kline*
I. INTRODUCTION
N late August 2006, Canadian officials confirmed the eighth case of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), known as Mad Cow Dis-
ease, in Canada.1 While the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFrA) allows free trade in cattle and beef products between Canada,
Mexico, and the United States, initial cases of Canadian BSE in 2003
closed the NAFTA border for beef and cattle trade.2 This act brought
devastating effects to Canadian producers.3 Canada needed a complex
set of regulatory measures to deal with BSE and restore trade.4 The lat-
est BSE case questions the effectiveness of trade regulations, how BSE
regulations impact trade, and what Canada should do to improve NAFTA
productivity in beef and cattle.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA ON
CANADIAN CATTLE TRADING
In 1994, NAFTA removed quotas and tariffs for cattle and beef prod-
ucts. 5 NAFTA, like other international trade agreements, attempts to re-
duce the level of risk that arises from these trade barriers so governments
can engage in international commerce. 6 Under NAFTA, governments
have voluntarily agreed to limit trade barriers, such as tariffs, by granting
preferential trade status to cattle and beef products produced within
NAIFTA countries, while penalizing goods from the non-NAFTA
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2. ALEXANDER MOENS, MAD Cow: A CASE STUDY IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELA-
TIONS 19-20, 23 (Fraser Institute Digital Publication 2006), http://www.fraser
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Canada utilized NAFTA to build its export market in cattle and beef
products.8 Cattle exports from Canada to the United States increased
"from .5 million [per] head in 1988 to over 1.5 million [per head] in
2002." 9 Additionally, beef exports increased "from 200,000 metric tons to
over 1 million."1 During this time, the industry became so successful
that "[b]eef became the second largest foreign exchange earner in the
Canadian agriculture sector after grain."11
The agrifood markets, which include beef and cattle in Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States, are "tightly integrated." 12 Because of this in-
tegration and in order to meet consumer demands, NAFTA countries
depend on food products flowing smoothly across their borders.
13
III. MAD COW DISEASE CONTINUES TO STRIKE CANADA
A. WHAT is BSE?
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or Mad Cow Disease is a
"progressive, fatal disease of the nervous system" that can affect a variety
of animals including cows, sheep, deer, elk, cats, mink, and humans.1 4
Scientists have not found the causative agent of BSE, nor have they de-
termined why some animals have short, two-year incubation periods
while others have incubation periods as long as eight years. 15
The United Kingdom identified the disease in 1986, and an epidemic
peaked there in 1993 when 1,000 new BSE cases were reported each
week. 16 Scientists believe the disease originated from cows that ate ren-
dered sheep parts with a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy called
scrapie 1 7 Today, most scientists believe contaminated feed spreads the
disease.1 8
While clinical signs such as "nervous or aggressive behavior, abnormal
posture, lack of coordination or difficulty in rising from a lying position,
7. Id.; DANNY G. LEROY ET AL., DISRUPTION IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN FOR BEEF AND
PORK: WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WHAT WAS NAFTA DOING 6 (North Ameri-
can Agrifood Market Integration Consortium (NAAMIC) 2005), http://www.farm
foundation.org/naamic/sanantonio/leroy.pdf.
8. MOENS, supra note 2, at 2; Press Release, Fraser Institute, US Not Protectionist on
Mad Cow, Canada to Benefit from Industry Changes (Mar. 30, 2006) (http://www.
fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?snav=nr&id=719).
9. MOENS, supra note 2, at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 20.
12. DAVID SPARLING & JULIE A. CASWELL, A NAFTA APPROACH TO ANIMAL
HEALTH AND BIOSECURITY: PIPE DREAM OR POSSIBILITY 109 (NAAMIC 2005),
http://naamic.tamu.edu/sanantonio/sparling.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE),
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/bseesbfse.shtml
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007) [hereinafter BSE].
15. LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 4.
16. Id.
17. Id.; BSE, supra note 14.
18. LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 4.
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decreased milk production, and weight loss" may appear in animals four
to five years after exposure to the disease and last from two to six months
before the animal dies, there is no test to diagnose BSE in live animals.' 9
A microscopic brain examination after death is the only way to confirm
diagnosis of BSE.20 Additionally, scientists believe humans can contract
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) by eating BSE-contaminated
meat.21 The symptoms and diagnosis of vCJD resemble BSE even
though there is no scientific evidence linking BSE to vCJD.22 Like BSE,
there is no test, no vaccine, and no cure available for humans with
vCJD.23
B. HISTORY OF BSE IN CANADA
Canada made BSE a reportable disease in 1990.24 On May 20, 2003,
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) reported that Canada had
its first indigenous case of BSE, likely caused by contaminated feed eaten
by an eight-year-old Black Angus beef cow. 25 Unlike earlier cases of
BSE, the cow from Wanham, Alberta was born and raised in Canada. 26
Producing for NAFTA and domestic markets for so long left North
American producers unprepared when these markets closed due to
BSE.27 Over the years, Canadian producers became dependent on for-
eign market access, especially the United States, and found themselves
unable to afford long embargoes on their perishable beef and cattle
exports. 28
C. CANADA'S LATEST BSE CASES
Two additional cases of Canadian BSE arose in the summer of 2006.29
On July 13, Canadian officials diagnosed a fifty-month-old dairy cow born
after the country imposed feed restrictions in 1997; in late August, offi-
cials confirmed this was Canada's eighth case of BSE.30 Additionally, on
August 23, Canada confirmed another case of BSE from a cow in Alberta
that was between eight and ten years old. 31 The age of this cow indicates
it could have contracted the disease before Canada's feed ban in 1997;
19. BSE, supra note 14.
20. Id.
21. LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. BSE, supra note 14.
25. MOENS, supra note 2, at 23.
26. LEROY, NAFTA, supra note 7, at 2.
27. DANNY G. LEROY ET AL., DISRUPTION IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN FOR BEEF AND CAT-
TLE: AN EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES 59 (NAAMIC 2005),
http://naamic.tamu.edu/sanantonio/leroy.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Greg Quinn, Canada Food Agency Confirms 8th Case of Mad Cow (Update 1),
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nevertheless, it was Canada's fifth case of BSE in 2006 alone. 32
The case of the younger Canadian cow illustrates "the difficulties of
enforcing feed bans to curb the spread of the disease." 33 The fifty-month-
old cow was the youngest diagnosed with BSE in Canada. 34 While most
other cases involved older cattle that contracted the disease before the
implementation of feed restrictions in Canada, cases in March 1998, Janu-
ary 2006, and July 2006 involved cattle born after the feed ban.35
An investigation by the CFIA found banned ingredients used at a feed
supplier and shipped to the animal's farm were the likely cause of the
disease. 36 Additionally, the CFIA report explained, "'[h]ad the animal
succumbed to BSE and not to an unrelated disease,"' mastitis of the ud-
der, "'it may have been some time before BSE symptoms would have
been noted." 37 Some experts argue BSE could infect a cow long before
the onset of symptoms. 38 But the CFIA "downplayed that possibility"
saying the variance of BSE detection "'is not significantly different from
that of previous cases and indicates exposure to only a very low dose of
BSE infectivity.' 39
IV. EFFECTS OF BSE IN CANADA: DISRUPTION OF
TRADE AND BORDER CLOSINGS
The Canadian cattle industry suffered severe monetary losses during
the 2003 BSE crisis.40 Mexico and the United States, some of Canada's
largest consumers, were just two of thirty-four countries that closed their
borders to Canadian live cattle and beef products. 4 1 The extended dura-
tion of these border closures raises questions about the effectiveness of
international trade agreements, such as NAFTA, which involve managing
human and animal health issues. 42 Many critics also question NAFTA's
effectiveness when one diseased cow results in the lengthy closure of
thirty-four markets. 43 Conversely, while the sudden border closure dev-
astated Canada's cattle industry, it took time to reduce the risk of spread-
ing the disease and to establish regulations to remove specified risk
32. Timeline of BSE in Canada and the U.S., CBC NEws ONLINE, Aug. 24, 2006, http://
www.cbc.ca/news/background/madcow/timeline.html.
33. Carlisle, supra note 1, at A8.
34. Id.
35. Id.; CHARLES E. HANRAHAN & GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, MAD Cow DISEASE AND U.S. BEEF TRADE 4, CRS Rep. No.
RS21709 (2006), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS
21709.pdf.
36. CBS News, Alberta cow likely got BSE from infected feed: CFIA, CBC NEws, Aug.
25, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/canadaledmonton/story/2006/08/25/bse-feed.html.
37. Canadian BSE Case May Indicate Testing Regimes Are Missing Infections, CAT-




40. MOENS, supra note 2, at 3.
41. Id. at 23; LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 3.
42. LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 3.
43. Id.
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materials (SRMs) from feedlots.44
Trade was disrupted dramatically. Canadian slaughter plants refused
new cattle, the government stopped beef shipments, the United States
returned live animals to Canada, packing plants reduced activities and
employees, and cattle truckers and ranchers lost work.45 Total farm
losses for cattle from 2003 to 2005 reached Canadian $6 to $7 billion.46
Because exports stopped immediately, 48 percent of production returned
to the Canadian market, causing prices to plunge at the farm level.47
Prior to the 2003 BSE crises, "approximately 120,000 live cattle per
month crossed the border into the United States. '48 After the border
closings, there were approximately 350,000 backlogged cattle which
needed to be culled.49
NAFTA market integration, border closings, and months without full
restoration of trade exacerbated the economic impact of BSE.50 Produc-
ers, companies, and countries failed to comprehend "the risks generated
from market integration in the absence of regulatory integration. '51 Ad-
ditionally, losing export markets led to a surplus of cattle in Canada.5 2
The degree to which NAFTA helped integrate the cattle market in
North America ultimately came back to hurt Canadian producers. 53 The
BSE crisis in Canada "demonstrates the devastating effects of this short-
coming on producers of a perishable product who are reliant on export
markets. '54 Unfortunately, governments have been unable to negotiate
international trade agreements to prevent similar border closures. 55
V. THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY MEASURES ON TRADE
Today, complex systems of animal health management in individual
NAFTA countries strive to integrate federal, state or provincial, and pri-
vate activities. 56 Canada has taken regulatory measures to protect food
supplies and animals from BSE.57
Even before the first indigenous case of BSE in 2003, Canada had a
number of regulations in place. In 1990, Canada made BSE a reportable
44. MOENS, supra note 2, at 48.
45. LEROY, NAFTA, supra note 7, at 12.
46. MOENS, supra note 2, at 48.
47. SPARLING, supra note 12, at 126.
48. United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service [FAS],
One Confirmed Case of BSE in Canada Causes Major Disruption in Trade, http://
www.fas.usda.gov/dlp2/circular/2003/03-10LP/BSE.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
49. SPARLING, supra note 12, at 114.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. KEITH COLLINS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (USDA) FACTSHEET, ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF BSE FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN CATTLE AND BEEF INDUSTRIES,
(USDA June 9, 2005), http://www.usda.gov/documents/factsheetKeithCollins.pdf.
53. LEROY, POSSIBLE POLICY, supra note 27, at 59.
54. Id. at 59-60.
55. Id. at 59.
56. SPARLING, supra note 12, at 117.
57. BSE, supra note 14.
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disease, meaning, "any suspect case of BSE must be reported to a federal
veterinarian. '58 In 1992, Canada created a surveillance program to test
the brains of high-risk cattle for BSE.59 Canada's feed ban in 1997 pro-
hibited feeding "rendered protein products from ruminant animals (cat-
tle, sheep, goats, bison, elk or deer) to other ruminants. '60 Before these
stricter feed regulations in 1997, both Canada and the United States fed
cattle a diet containing these remains as a protein boost.61 In December
of 2000, the CFIA suspended all animal products from other countries
that had BSE.62 The following year, Canada created an identification
program that traced cattle from their original herd to slaughter.63
In 2003, Canada began requiring the removal of specified risk materials
(SRMs) from cattle slaughtered for human consumption. 64 SRMs are tis-
sues in the brain and spinal cord of BSE-infected cattle that may transmit
the disease. 65 But, cattle younger than thirty months do not have SRMs
removed because it is unlikely that this meat would be unsafe to con-
sume. 66 Also from 2003 onwards, to prevent pieces of cranial tissue or
brain matter from contaminating meat like in stunning (when a metal
object penetrates the brain at high speed), the CFIA only allows electri-
cal or non-invasive techniques for killing and butchering cattle. 67 Most
recently, on June 26, 2006, the CFIA banned SRMs in pet foods, livestock
feed, and fertilizer in an effort to accelerate the abolition of mad cow
disease.68
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) quickly labeled Canada
as the only country in the world with reportable BSE whose beef would
still be allowed in the United States. 69 Many argue this pro-free trade
action saved the Canadian beef industry after the BSE crisis of 2003.70
The USDA allowed "boneless beef cuts from animals under the age of 30
months [old] . . . back into the United States as early as September
2003." 71 Additionally, live cattle imports from Canada into the United
States resumed on July 18, 2005 after the USDA lifted a twenty-six-month
ban on cattle imports. 72 Since the United States partially re-opened the
border, seven more BSE cases have been found in Canada; however, they




61. Carlisle, supra note 1, at A8.
62. BSE, supra note 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.; MOENS, supra note 2, at 23.
65. BSE, supra note 14.
66. MOENS, supra note 2, at 23-24.
67. Id. at 24.
68. Timeline of BSE in Canada and the U.S., supra note 32.
69. MOENS, supra note 2, at 49.
70. Id. at 48-49.
71. Id. at 49.
72. Timeline of BSE in Canada and the U.S., supra note 32.
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2003.73 Under the USDA's guidelines, "Canada could have some 13
cases of BSE per year in its cattle over 24 months of age and still be able
to ship across the border."'74 Meanwhile, Canada inspects more than
40,000 animals per year, and many experts forecast that with higher in-
spection levels, more BSE cases could appear in Canada within a shorter
time frame. 75
The BSE crisis of 2003 allowed the United States and Canada to
restructure their cattle and beef trading relationship. 76 "The U.S. govern-
ment did not break trade law during the recent mad cow crisis, but ap-
plied international rules creatively," which quickly restored trade in beef
products. 77 After the border closures, the Canadian meatpacking indus-
try actually increased its capacity 20 percent in 2004 and 5 percent in
2005.78
Despite the improvements in the Canadian cattle industry, resuming
trade after border closures caused by BSE created an enormous problem
for NAFTA. 79 Even with Canada's 2001 identification program, experts
argue that one challenge for BSE case management is North America's
inadequate cattle tracing systems.80 In addition, while NAFTA partners
were the first to re-open their borders to Canada in 2003, when the
USDA proposed resuming live cattle trade across the Canadian-U.S. bor-
der in March 2005, legal actions by opponents in the U.S. cattle industry
delayed the re-opening. 8' These challenges indicate that trade resump-
tion has become an economic and political issue more than an animal and
human health issue.82
VI. HOW CAN CANADA IMPROVE NAFTA PRODUCTIVITY
IN BEEF AND CATITLE?
The most recent cases of BSE in Canada raise the questions of whether
the 1997 feed ban was effective, whether the industry needs better meth-
ods to deal with border closures and re-openings, and whether a NAFTA
approach to animal health could help the industry.
First, several cows born after the 1997 Canadian feed ban tested posi-
tive for BSE.83 These post-feed ban cases illustrate that the Canadian
feed problem has persisted. But, experts are uncertain if a total recall of
73. U.S. Not Protectionist on Mad Cow, supra note 8.
74. MOENS, supra note 2, at 49.
75. Id. at 50.
76. Id. at 49.
77. U.S. Not Protectionist on Mad Cow, supra note 8.
78. MOENS, supra note 2, at 3.
79. SPARLING, supra note 12, at 126.
80. Id.
81. Id.; See Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 05-35264, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17360, at *3 (9th Cir.
July 13, 2005) (reversing an injunction prohibiting the USDA from permitting the
resumption of Canadian cattle trade with the United States).
82. SPARLING, supra note 12, at 126.
83. MOENS, supra note 2, at 49.
2007]
706 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
feed prior to 1997 or stricter compliance standards would have eliminated
this problem. 84 There is also uncertainty about how strictly Canada ad-
hered to or enforced the feed ban.85 Experts suggest that to improve
productivity, Canada must exceed American compliance rates for feed
mills. 86
In 2003, Canadian cattle suppliers experienced the devastation of de-
pending on export markets for a perishable good.87 In addition to im-
proved feed mill compliance, the BSE crisis in 2003 underscored the need
for more integration and improved procedures to handle future border
closures. 88 While the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), the
world organization for animal health that sets the standards for trade in
animals and animal products, "has a protocol to close borders immedi-
ately on discovery of BSE or other serious diseases," neither the OIE,
NAFTA, nor the World Trade Organization have similar measures to re-
open borders and lift trade restrictions when the embargoed country can
provide information to other countries for risk assessment. 89
Canada should also apply its efforts to develop a stronger NAFTA rela-
tionship to work with other countries on trade integration and harmoni-
zation strategies. 90 Canada should limit its focus to building stronger
relationships with other NAFTA countries including the United States
and Mexico. 9 1 These countries should address harmonizing risk assess-
ments and prevention techniques in the North American market.92
Even though Canada, Mexico, and the United States began exploring
options to integrate beef and cattle trade in March 2005, efforts to create
stronger international relations with other countries in handling BSE
have shown little progress, possibly due to weak rules and political pre-
caution.9 3 But, individual national approaches no longer protect animal
or human health and are incapable of minimizing trade impacts of dis-
eases like BSE to the trade system.94 When individual countries lack
completely developed animal health systems, it becomes difficult to de-
velop integrated systems between them.95 To the contrary, countries tend
to shy away from sharing control with other counties on critical issues
involving biosecurity and human and animal health. 96 Therefore, negoti-
ations among a few NAFTA countries seem like the best place to start
84. Id.
85. Id. at 50.
86. Id.
87. LEROY, POSSIBLE POLICY, supra note 27, at 76; LEROY, NAFTA supra note 7, at
22.
88. LEROY, POSSIBLE POLICY, supra note 27, at 59.
89. Id. at 76; LEROY, NAFTA, supra note 7, at 22-23; LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 19.
90. MOENS, supra note 2, at 4.
91. Id. at 51.
92. Id.
93. Id.; LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 20.
94. SPARLING, supra note 12, at 110.
95. Id. at 131.
96. Id. at 118.
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integrating trade and animal health procedures. 97
The bottom line is that "[i]nfectious diseases do not respect national
borders,"' and increased trade and travel prevents borders from serving
as effective disease barriers.98 Therefore, countries should strive to im-
plement a NAFTA approach to animal health management that involves
coordinated trade policies, market integration, and strategies for
"[p]revention[,] [i]nitial response to outbreaks and cases of animal dis-
ease[,] and [t]rade resumption after disruption." 99 NAFTA countries can
coordinate policy, agree to regulatory programs, and harmonize their
standards and enforcement mechanisms by making them identical.100 Be-
cause countries such as the United States and Mexico are signatories to
NAFTA and have free access to the Canadian beef market, these mea-
sures will likely prove most beneficial for Canada. 10 1
VII. CONCLUSION
While Canada implemented trade regulations to manage BSE and re-
store trade, recent cases of BSE found in cattle born after the 1997 feed
ban continue to raise questions about the effectiveness of international
trade agreements. Because of the elusive nature of BSE, young cattle
infected with the disease increase the risk of contaminated beef entering
the food chain. In the event of another trade crisis, Canada must have
methods to deal not only with border closures, but also with prompt bor-
der re-openings and trade resumption. Finally, Canada should integrate
trade strategies with NAFIA countries such as the United States and
Mexico to prevent similar crises.
97. LOPPACHER, supra note 6, at 21.
98. SPARLING, supra note 12, at 112-13.
99. Id. at 116.
100. Id. at 118.
101. US Not Protectionist on Mad Cow, supra note 8.
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